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INTRODUCTION
When, if ever, should a corporation be subject to a court’s
jurisdiction based solely on the activities of another entity? Commonly,
injured plaintiffs pursue foreign1 corporations to recover for injuries
inflicted upon them by some activity of that corporation or its subsidiary.
Where plaintiffs are unable to establish personal jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation directly, plaintiffs may attempt to establish
jurisdiction over the corporation indirectly by imputing to it the in-forum
activities of a closely related subsidiary.2 This form of jurisdictional
blame shifting has been termed “vicarious jurisdiction,”3 and it stems from
the understanding that more than one entity may be responsible for the
same events. Vicarious jurisdiction arguments are used to establish both
specific and general adjudicative jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
Specific jurisdiction is available for claims that arise out of, or are
related to, the defendant’s activity or contacts within the forum.4 In
contrast, general jurisdiction is available for claims that are unrelated to
the defendant’s activities in the forum only if the defendant has a
constitutionally sufficient relationship with the forum to be deemed “at

1 For the moment, “foreign” may refer to either a corporation domiciled outside the
territory of the United States or a domestic corporation domiciled outside the territory of
the state in which the Plaintiff files suit.
2 See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted) (“Generally, a foreign parent corporation is not subject to the
jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing business
there; the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the
assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign parent. It has long been recognized, however, that
in some circumstances, a close relationship between a parent and its subsidiary may justify
a finding that the parent ‘does business’ in a jurisdiction through the local activities of its
subsidiaries.”).
3 See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (2004). Others have called the practice “jurisdictional veil
piercing.” Id. at 1029–30.
4 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)
(quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (“Specific jurisdiction, on the
other hand, depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
subject to the State’s regulation.”)).
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home” there.5 Traditionally, corporations are “at home” in the state or
states in which they are incorporated or maintain a principal place of
business.6 Once general jurisdiction is established, the court has authority
to adjudicate any claim brought against that defendant in the forum,
regardless of whether the claims relate to the defendant’s activities in the
forum.7
The practice of imputing the contacts of a subsidiary to establish
jurisdiction over the parent is historically more available in the context of
specific jurisdiction. While a state’s regulatory interest in addressing
harms caused by an absent defendant’s in-state activities is obvious, its
regulatory interest in the out-of-state affairs of an in-state business is
markedly lower.8 Thus, imputation arguments to establish specific
jurisdiction are more defensible as consistent with the state’s regulatory
interest in addressing in-state activity related to the claims. In the same
way, imputation arguments to establish general jurisdiction are met with
caution due to the state’s tenuous regulatory interest in the out-of-state
activity.9 Accordingly, uncertainty remains as to the circumstances under
which vicarious jurisdiction arguments will successfully establish general
jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation.
Recently, the Supreme Court affirmatively approved the use of
vicarious jurisdiction arguments to establish general jurisdiction over
foreign corporate defendants.10 In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court held
5 Id. (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreigncountry) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with
the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the
forum State.”).
6 Id. at 2853–54 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer Haverkamp, & Buck Logan, A
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)).
7 Id. at 2851.
8 See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 698 (1987) (“[T]he state sometimes must
exercise authority over persons outside its borders to give effect to the legitimate regulatory
authority within its borders . . . .Recognition of this kind of jurisdiction is implicit in . . . the
Court’s articulation of what is now known as ‘specific jurisdiction,’ that is, the power of
the state to assert jurisdiction to redress a legal wrong committed or suffered within the
state.”).
9 See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1092 (“[T]he exercise of general jurisdiction in veilpiercing cases is uniquely problematic insofar as there will never be a regulatory interest
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction when its sole basis is a reliance on veil piercing or
some other artifice to merge otherwise separate entities.”).
10 In so ruling, the Court declined an opportunity to define a rule to govern when and
how a subsidiary’s contacts might be imputed to a parent corporation, an issue that has
been the subject of much dispute. Because state law largely governs theories of imputation,
a corporation could be at the mercy of a different state law in any given forum, and some
laws of imputation are more pro-jurisdiction than others. The proper standard to govern
imputation is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader should consult the
writings of Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, which provide an overview of the various theories
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that the Due Process Clause permits, in limited circumstances, the exercise
of general jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation based on the
activities and contacts of its in-forum subsidiary.11 The Court determined
that imputation of the subsidiary’s in-forum contacts to the foreign parent
is insufficient by itself to establish general jurisdiction over the parent;12
instead, after successful imputation, a court must conduct an additional
inquiry to determine whether the parent corporation has contacts with the
forum independently sufficient to subject it to the court’s general
jurisdiction.13
Does the Bauman test raise an insurmountably high bar for
exercising general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants based on
imputed contacts? For example, under what circumstances would a
foreign defendant ever be “at home”14 in a forum wherein its own contacts
with the forum were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction in the first
place? In Bauman, the imputed contacts of a concededly “at home”
subsidiary were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over the
foreign parent. According to the Court, a sufficient showing of activity or
contacts in the forum could satisfy the ultimate “at home” inquiry as to the
parent corporation if its subsidiary’s contacts were also imputed to the
parent. The Court left for future determination the quantity or quality of
in-forum activities and contacts that would satisfy its standard.
Appropriately, the Court’s decision in Bauman sharply confines the
extent to which the imputation of a subsidiary’s contacts will be sufficient
of attribution and an argument against using substantive law in the determining imputation.
See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (2004); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Further Thinking About Vicarious
Jurisdiction: Reflecting on Goodyear v. Brown and Looking Ahead to Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 34 U. PA. L. REV. 765 (2013). Notably, the third prong of the Bauman test creates
a constitutional limit on the ability of state law imputation theories to establish general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, which perhaps eases many of the concerns Hoffman
raises. See infra Parts I.C.2.–II.
11 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 n.16 (2014). This case will be discussed
in detail, infra Part I.C.
12 Id. Prior to Bauman, the lower courts routinely exercised general jurisdiction over
foreign corporate defendants upon the initial determination that a subsidiary’s in-forum
contacts could be imputed to the parent. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort &
Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1362–63 (11th Cir. 2006); Meier ex rel. Meier v.
Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2002).
13 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 760 n.16 (citing Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea
Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at Part B.1, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014)
(“[T]his Court mandates that contacts be shown for every defendant over whom
jurisdiction is sought.”)); accord Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (“[T]he
requirements of International Shoe must be met as to each defendant over whom a state
court exercises jurisdiction.”).
14 The history of corporate domicile and the “at home” standard that has come to
govern where corporations are subject to suit is discussed at length, infra Parts I.A–B.
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to establish general jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation.
Nevertheless, vicarious jurisdiction arguments remain a viable means for
establishing general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants. The
aim of this paper is to ascertain the parameters and efficacy of utilizing
vicarious jurisdiction theories to establish general jurisdiction over foreign
corporate defendants in light of Bauman. Part I first observes the historical
development of general jurisdiction in federal courts. Next, Part I
concentrates on Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court’s recent landmark
decision regarding general jurisdiction and imputation. Part II analyzes
the continuing viability of vicarious jurisdiction after Bauman, arguing
that several limited avenues remain open for using imputation theories to
establish general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants.
I. GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN U.S. FEDERAL COURT
A court has general jurisdiction over any defendant who is “at home”
in the forum.15 While individuals are deemed “at home” in the singular
location of their domicile,16 a corporation is “at home” in both its state of
incorporation and its principal place of business, if the two are distinct.17
The state of incorporation is the state whose laws give the corporation its
personhood. The location of a corporation’s principal place in business is
less formally determined. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the Supreme Court
announced that a corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve
center”—the singular locus in which its “officers direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation’s activities.”18
The “at home” inquiry, then, is an examination of the defendant’s
relationship to the forum and to the litigation. This general rule is the
culmination of over a century of Supreme Court precedent delineating the
constitutional boundaries of general jurisdiction over nonresident,
corporate defendants. Those precedents are discussed below.

15 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54
(2011).
16 Id. at 2853.
17 Id. at 2854–54 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer Haverkamp, & Buck Logan, A
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 735 (1988) (“Domicile, place
of incorporation, and principal place of business are paradigms of bases for general
jurisdiction.”)). As will be discussed below, the Court left open the possibility that general
jurisdiction could lie where a corporation’s contacts with the forum were so continuous
and systematic that it could be rendered “essentially at home” in that forum. Id. at 2851
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(statutorily restricting a corporation’s citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction to
“every” state in which it is incorporated and “the” state in which it has its principal place
of business).
18 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192–93 (2010).
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A. EARLY HISTORY

1. Strict Territoriality of Pennoyer v. Neff
In its infancy, personal jurisdiction was a function of the court’s
“power over the defendant’s person.”19 Courts had adjudicatory power
only over defendants who were physically present in the state or who had
otherwise consented to the court’s jurisdiction.20 For individuals, physical
presence equated to the person’s domicile21 or any state wherein the person
was physically served with process.22 For corporations, physical presence
was largely understood to be the state of its incorporation,23 and the court’s
“power” over a corporation was substantiated by in-state service of
process upon its corporate officers.24 The Supreme Court formalized this
strict territoriality era of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff when it
determined that principles of state sovereignty forbid a state court to
“extend its process beyond that territory” and exercise jurisdiction over
the “persons or property” of another state.25
Despite an apparently impenetrable rule of territorial personal
jurisdiction, Pennoyer allowed two exceptions. The first exception
permitted a court to exercise jurisdiction over absent defendants where the
claims involved the forum state’s regulatory interest in defining civil
status, such as marriage.26 The second exception preserved a state’s right
to require that a nonresident entering into “a partnership or association”
within the state appoint some person on whom process may be served
within the State.27 The in-state presence of the agent on whom process
19

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
McCormick v. Pennsylvania Cent. R. Co., 49 N.Y. 303, 309 (1872) (acknowledging
that “voluntary appearance confers jurisdiction of the person” had been the accepted rule
since 1819).
21 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (“The jurisdiction of the
United States over its absent citizen . . . is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally
bound to take notice of the laws that are applicable to him and to obey them.”).
22 See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1036 (“At one time, in-state service was necessary for
jurisdiction because of the territorial limitations imposed by the power theory.”).
23 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (“[A] corporation can
have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created.”).
24 M’Queen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5, 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (“The
process against a corporation, must be served on its head, or principal officer, within the
jurisdiction of the sovereignty where this artificial body exists.”).
25 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
26 Id. at 734–35 (“The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon
which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for
which it may be dissolved.”).
27 Id. at 735. Historically, states often required nonresident corporations, in exchange
for the “privilege” of doing business within the state, to appoint an in-state agent to receive
process for suits arising from the in-state business activities. In this way, corporations
“consented” to personal jurisdiction in the forum and could not insulate themselves from
20
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could be served, then, became sufficient to exercise jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant.
Still, this extraterritorial exception for corporate agents was limited
in two ways. First, the authority of the agent to act on behalf of a
nonresident defendant dissolved at the border of the state in which it was
appointed to receive process.28 Second, a court’s jurisdiction over such
nonresident defendants was only available for claims related to business
transactions in the state.29 Thus, under Pennoyer, the adjudicatory
authority of the courts was generally limited to the territorial borders of
the forum state, and absent actual presence or consent, nonresident
corporations could never be under the court’s general jurisdiction, no
matter how extensive its business transactions within the forum.
2. A Looser Doctrine Approved in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington
Pennoyer’s strict territoriality regime ended in 1945 when the
Supreme Court announced the “minimum contacts” test of personal
jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.30 The Court
determined that the Due Process Clause would support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants if two requirements
were met: first, the defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with
the forum state; and second, the “maintenance of the suit” against the
defendant in the forum must not “offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”31 This new minimum contacts test ushered in the
reigning contacts-based era of personal jurisdiction, wherein jurisdiction
is a function of the defendant’s relationship with the forum rather than the
court’s territorial “power” over the defendant.

liability by virtue of residing outside of the state. E.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
JUDGMENTS § 29 & cmt. a, b. (1942).
28 See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 357 (1882) (“We do not, however,
understand the laws as authorizing the service . . . upon an agent of a foreign corporation
unless the corporation be engaged in business in the state, and the agent be appointed to
act there. We so construe the words ‘agent of such corporation within this state.’ They do
not sanction service upon an officer or agent of the corporation who resides in another
state, and is only casually in the state, and not charged with any business of the corporation
there.”); M’Queen, 16 Johns. at 7 (“If the president of a bank of another state, were to come
within this state, he would not represent the corporation here; his functions and his
character would not accompany him, when he moved beyond the jurisdiction of the
government under whose laws he derived this character . . . .”).
29 See, e.g., Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22 (1907)
(“Such assent cannot properly be implied where it affirmatively appears, as it does here,
that the business was not transacted in [the forum].”).
30 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
31 Id. at 316.
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Beyond loosening the strictly territorial rule of Pennoyer, the Court
in Int’l Shoe recognized for the first time two distinct strands of personal
jurisdiction. In announcing its “minimum contacts” test, the Court
distinguished between claims that arise out of, or relate to, the defendant’s
forum contacts—known as specific jurisdiction—and claims that are
unrelated to defendant’s forum contacts—known as general jurisdiction.
As to those claims arising out of a non-resident defendant’s in-forum
contacts, the Court held that subjecting a nonresident corporation to suit
“can . . . hardly be said to be undue” where it incurs state-law obligations
in exchange for the privilege of conducting business in the state.32 But
regarding those claims arising “from dealings entirely distinct” from a
nonresident corporation’s in-state activities, the Court was more reserved,
holding that there may be some circumstances “in which the continuous
corporate operations . . . were thought so substantial and of such a nature
as to justify suit” against the defendant.33 Accordingly, specific
jurisdiction became more readily available over nonresident corporate
defendants. The ambiguous “continuous corporate operations” basis for
exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation became known
as the “doing business” test for general jurisdiction,34 and it has been
employed successfully on only one occasion.35 For corporations then, Int’l
Shoe superseded the strict “presence” test of Pennoyer and enabled courts,
at least in theory, to assert general jurisdiction over nonresident
corporations if the corporation had constitutionally sufficient in-forum
contacts, however unrelated to the claim those contacts might be.
The trajectory of the two jurisdictional strands has been widely
divergent since their pronouncement.36 While specific jurisdiction
remains broadly available over nonresident defendants,37 the Court has
“declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally
recognized.”38 This more limited exercise of general jurisdiction over
foreign defendants results from the Court’s determination that the Due
Process Clause requires a greater showing of forum contacts to exercise
32

Id. at 319.
Id. at 318.
34 Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1147 (1966).
35 See infra Part I.B. The standard has been successfully met in lower courts, but
whether the Supreme Court would uphold many such applications is in serious doubt.
36 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 757–58 (2014).
37 After Int’l Shoe, even a single contact with the forum can satisfy the minimum
contacts test for specific jurisdiction. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957) (emphasis added) (holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation was proper because “the suit was based on a contract which had
substantial connection with [the forum state]”).
38 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 757–58.
33
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general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.39 Where the claims do
not arise out of or relate to the nonresident corporation’s contacts with the
forum, the Court has been hesitant to subject the corporation to suit in the
forum.40 Accordingly, the very contacts that might justify exercising
specific jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant could be
insufficient to exercise general jurisdiction.41
B. THE DECLINE OF “DOING BUSINESS” IN GENERAL JURISDICTION:
PERKINS, HELICOPTEROS, AND GOODYEAR

After Int’l Shoe was decided, the Court handed down Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.42 In Perkins, a Philippines-based
mining company relocated to Ohio to continue business operations during
World War II. Eventually, the company was sued in Ohio for conduct that
occurred in the Philippines and which was unrelated to its business
activities in Ohio. The corporation’s Ohio-based business activity
included “directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock
transfers, payments of salaries, [and] purchasing of machinery.”43 The
Court determined that though the corporation was neither incorporated nor
maintained its principal place of business in Ohio, its in-state activities
were nevertheless “continuous and systematic” such that general

39 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952) (“It remains
only to consider . . . whether, as a matter of federal due process, the business done in Ohio
by the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to
permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of
action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio.”).
40 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (noting that general jurisdiction has been “less dominant”
in the court’s due process jurisprudence); see also Michael H. Hoffheimer, General
Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN.
L. REV. 549, 550 (2012) (“Goodyear Dunlop Tires, supported by a unanimous Court,
predictably conformed to prior decisions that evidence the Court’s reluctance to permit
general jurisdiction over corporations based upon claims unrelated to corporate activity in
the forum state.”).
41 See, e.g., Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 757 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2849 (2011) (“Although the placement of a product into
the stream of commerce ‘may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction,’ we
explained, such contacts ‘do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum
has general jurisdiction over a defendant.’”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 779–80 (1984) (“In the instant case, respondent’s activities in the forum may not be
so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to those activities.
But respondent is carrying on a ‘part of its general business’ in New Hampshire, and that
is sufficient to support jurisdiction when the cause of action arises out of the very activity
being conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.”).
42 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
43 Id. at 445.
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jurisdiction was proper in Ohio for claims entirely unrelated to its activities
in the forum.44
Perkins has been considered the outer-limits of general jurisdiction
in that the Court permitted general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
for claims arising from overseas conduct unrelated to the defendant’s
activities in the forum. Accordingly, Perkins has also been considered the
exemplary case for exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation based on its “doing business” in the forum.45 However, the
assertion that the Supreme Court in Perkins affirmed “doing business” as
a constitutionally sound means for establishing general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation is likely incorrect.46 The Court in one breath explained
its decision in Perkins as “permitting general jurisdiction where
defendant’s contacts with the forum were ‘continuous and systematic,’”47
and in another breath explained that jurisdiction was proper in Perkins
because Ohio had become the corporation’s “de facto principal place of
business.”48
After Perkins came Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, a case arising out of a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four United
States citizens.49 The victims’ survivors filed suit in Texas against the
manufacturer, a Colombian corporation, arguing that general jurisdiction
lay because the defendant had negotiated a contract, purchased helicopter
parts, and sent employees for training in Texas50 and therefore had the
“kind of continuous and systematic business contacts the Court found to
exist in Perkins.”51 The Court held, however, that in-state purchases by a
foreign defendant were insufficient to exercise general jurisdiction over
it.52 With its holding, the Court curtailed the reach of “doing business” as
a means to establish general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.
After Helicopteros, “doing business” general jurisdiction over foreign
defendants would require more robust business activities than consumer
transactions within the forum.

44

Id. at 448–49.
See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172–73 & n.7 (2001) (citing Perkins as the model
of general jurisdiction based on a foreign corporation’s ‘continuous and systematic’
business activities in the forum).
46 See discussion infra pp. 20–21.
47 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984) (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448).
48 E.g., Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 756; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
49 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
50 Id. at 408.
51 Id. at 416.
52 Id. at 418.
45
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Lastly, following Helicopteros the Court decided Goodyear Dunlop
v. Brown and unanimously determined that a foreign manufacturer’s sales
of goods within the forum state did not provide Perkins-like business
activities for exercising general jurisdiction over the foreign corporation
in that state.53 In Goodyear, two American boys were killed in France as
a result of a bus rollover accident.54 The administrators of the boys’ estates
filed suit in North Carolina state court against Goodyear USA, Goodyear
France, Goodyear Luxembourg, and Goodyear Turkey, alleging that a tire,
defectively manufactured and sold by Goodyear Turkey, caused the fatal
rollover.55 The Court first held that the North Carolina court could not
exercise specific personal jurisdiction because the deaths in France were
unrelated to any corporate activity in the state.56 Next, the Court held that
where “sales of [defendants’] tires [were] sporadically made in North
Carolina through intermediaries,” the corporate activity in the forum was
insufficient to support general personal jurisdiction.57 Accordingly, the
Court concluded, the corporate subsidiaries in Goodyear were “in no sense
at home” in North Carolina.58
In reaching its conclusion, the Court confirmed that a corporation’s
place of incorporation and principal place of business, its “paradigmatic
affiliations,” are the strongest for establishing general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations.59 Nevertheless, the Court declined an opportunity to
firmly limit general jurisdiction to a corporation’s place of incorporation
or principal place of business. In terms not unlike those of Int’l Shoe,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, announced that a foreign
corporation could have such continuous business activity to render it
“essentially at home” in the forum for purposes of general jurisdiction.60
In that case, however, Goodyear’s “sporadic” sales to the forum were
insufficient to render it “essentially at home” in the state.61 The amount

53 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see also
Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 459–50 (2012) (“The unanimous
opinion categorically distinguished between general and specific personal jurisdiction,
making clear that limited sales do not satisfy the ‘substantial’ activity or ‘continuous and
systematic’ contacts required for general jurisdiction.”).
54 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 2851.
57 Id. at 2856.
58 Id. at 2857.
59 Id. at 2854 (citing Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEXAS L. REV. 721, 728 (1988) (identifying place of incorporation and principal place of
business as “paradigm” bases for exercising general jurisdiction over corporations)).
60 Id. at 2851.
61 Id. at 2857.

12

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1

or type of contacts that could satisfy Goodyear’s “essentially at home”
standard remains as unclear as Int’l Shoe’s ambiguous “continuous
business contacts” basis for general jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants.
After Goodyear, the “doing business” theory of jurisdiction is likely
abrogated as regards general jurisdiction because merely transacting
business—via sales (Goodyear) or purchases (Helicopteros)—in the
forum will be insufficient; rather, the Court requires that the business
activities be so substantial that a foreign corporation could be fairly
characterized as “at home” in the paradigmatic senses. Though Perkins
gave a glimmer of hope for establishing general jurisdiction based on a
foreign defendant’s business activities in the state, the Court’s
pronouncements in Goodyear and Helicopteros prove the reluctance with
which the Court authorizes general jurisdiction outside of the traditional
paradigmatic affiliations. While it remains unclear just what type and
extent of business activities could render a corporation “essentially at
home” after Goodyear, that the standard is exceedingly high is clear.
C. DAIMLER AG V. BAUMAN

1. The Ninth Circuit Opinion
The suit in Daimler AG v. Bauman arose out of human rights
violations committed entirely in Argentina by Mercedes-Benz Argentina
(MBA), a wholly owned subsidiary of Daimler A.G. (Daimler), a German
corporation.62 The Plaintiffs, residents of Argentina, alleged that MBA
conspired with Argentine security forces to effectuate acts of kidnapping,
detention, torture, and murder.63 The plaintiffs sued Daimler in California,
alleging Daimler was vicariously liable for its subsidiary’s actions.64
Because all events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred in Argentina,
personal jurisdiction in California would only lie if Daimler could be
subject to general jurisdiction there. The plaintiffs argued that general
jurisdiction over Daimler was proper because Mercedes-Benz U.S.A
(MBUSA)—Daimler’s indirect subsidiary—had sufficient business
contacts to subject it to California’s general jurisdiction and that those
contacts could be imputed to Daimler.65
The Ninth Circuit first determined that MBUSA’s business activities
in the forum were so “extensive” that it could be considered “at home” in
62

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014).
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) rev’d sub nom.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
64 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 750–51.
65 Id. at 751.
63
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the forum and therefore subject to California’s general jurisdiction.66
Then, the Court applied California agency law and determined that the
California contacts of MBUSA may be imputed to Daimler for the purpose
of general jurisdiction.67 After imputing to Daimler the contacts of its “at
home” subsidiary, the Ninth Circuit held that exercising personal
jurisdiction over Daimler “comport[ed] with fair play and substantial
justice.”68
The loose imputation framework employed by the Ninth Circuit for
asserting general jurisdiction over foreign corporations was common
among lower courts before Bauman reached the Supreme Court. Lower
courts ended the jurisdictional inquiry over a foreign corporate defendant
once it could be determined that a subsidiary’s contacts could be imputed
to the parent under the applicable substantive law of imputation.69 If an
“at home” subsidiary’s contacts were successfully imputed to the foreign
parent, the foreign parent was deemed subject to the court’s general
jurisdiction based on its relationship with its subsidiary. The approach of
the lower courts pre-Bauman was flawed in at least two respects: First,
the framework threatened an unprecedented expansion of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations by making general jurisdiction a function of
inconsistent state substantive rules of imputation rather than traditional
paradigmatic affiliations.70 Second, the approach implicitly rejected any
need to establish sufficient jurisdictional contacts as to each individual
defendant, as the Due Process Clause requires.71
2. Bauman in the Supreme Court
Though the Supreme Court had opportunity in Bauman to address
the first issue of which substantive law would govern when and how a
subsidiary’s contacts could be imputed to a foreign parent, it turned instead
to the constitutional due process issue of establishing general jurisdiction
over foreign defendants based on their contacts with the forum. The Court
rejected the current of lower courts exercising general jurisdiction over

66 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) rev’d sub nom.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Notably, whether MBUSA was
appropriately subject to general jurisdiction in California based on its business activities
was not disputed. Id. at 913.
67 Id. at 921–24.
68 Id. at 929–30.
69 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
70 See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60 (“The Ninth Circuit’s agency theory thus appears
to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state
subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of
general jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear.”).
71 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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foreign defendants based on imputation alone.72 Instead, the Court
announced a framework for using vicarious jurisdiction arguments to
secure general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Though largely
consistent with the framework applied in lower courts, the Court added a
third prong to the analysis that serves as a constitutional limit on any
substantive law of imputation that a court could use to find general
jurisdiction based on attribution of contacts alone.73 The Bauman
framework is invoked when a plaintiff, seeking to sue a nonresident
corporate defendant for claims unrelated to its in-forum business activities,
looks to the corporation’s relationship with some other entity in the chosen
forum to determine whether the contacts of the related entity might be
sufficient to hold the defendant responsible in that forum. In response to
this typical “vicarious jurisdiction” argument, courts must:
First, determine whether the other entity—often a wholly or
majority owned subsidiary74—is “at home” in the forum.75 If it is
not at home there, the general jurisdiction inquiry is decided
against the plaintiff because imputation theories, even if available,
would be unsuccessful under the test.
Second, determine whether the subsidiary’s in-forum contacts
may be imputed to the parent under the relevant law.76 If
imputation is unavailable, the general jurisdiction inquiry ends and
will be decided against the plaintiff. For the purposes of this paper,
the second step in the Bauman framework will be assumed
satisfied under any standard a court could impose.
Third, determine whether the foreign parent is yet “at home” in
the forum after the contacts of its “at home” subsidiary are imputed
it.77

Moving through this framework, the Court assumed that MBUSA
was “at home” in California, though it was neither incorporated nor had
its principal place of business there.78 The Court also assumed that
imputation was satisfied under applicable law.79 With the first two prongs
of its framework presumptively satisfied, the Court moved to the third
prong of its analysis and determined that Daimler could not be
characterized as “at home” in California for purposes of general
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Bauman, 132 S.Ct. at 760 n.16
Bauman, 132 S.Ct. at 760.
See infra pp. 24–26 and note 96.
Bauman, 132 S. Ct. at 760.
Id.; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Bauman, 132 S. Ct. at 760.
Id. at 751, 758, 760.
Id. at 760.
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jurisdiction even after being imputed with its “at home” subsidiary’s
contacts.80 This third prong of the Bauman framework is the platform
from which this paper springs, attempting to ascertain the circumstances
that could overcome prong three’s due process limit on the use of vicarious
jurisdiction arguments for asserting general jurisdiction over foreign
corporate defendants.
II. TILTING THE SCALES: USING VICARIOUS JURISDICTION ARGUMENTS
TO ESTABLISH GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATE
DEFENDANTS AFTER BAUMAN
At first blush, the test announced in Bauman appears circular,
impossible to satisfy because it ends where it begins. Closer inspection,
however, confirms that the Court did not deviously claim to merely limit
jurisdictional veil piercing in general jurisdiction while abrogating it in
practice. Instead, the Court adhered to its pervasive precedent of narrowly
construing general jurisdiction over foreign corporations by requiring that
the “at home” inquiry be individually satisfied as to the foreign defendant
after imputation.81 Certainly, the Bauman test raises a high bar, limiting
the efficacy of vicarious jurisdiction arguments to assert general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, but its bar is not insurmountable.
After Bauman, there remain several limited means by which a foreign
corporation may be subject to a court’s general jurisdiction based on its
relationship with another entity in the forum.
Bauman offers at least four distinct scenarios that, when weighed in
a post-imputation “at home” analysis as to the parent corporation, could
tilt the scales in a jurisdictional determination. First, Bauman indicates
that courts faced with vicarious jurisdiction arguments must distinguish
between cases in which a subsidiary is “at home” in the paradigmatic sense
and cases in which the subsidiary is “essentially at home” by some
measure of continuous and systematic business contacts.82 Second, the
Court suggests that in either circumstance, the theory of imputation used
to attribute contacts may affect the judgment.83 Third, if the subsidiary is
joined as a defendant in the action, the Court may be more readily
agreeable to a vicarious jurisdiction argument as to the parent.84 Finally,
80 Id. (“Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California, and further
to assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to
subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the
State hardly render it at home there.”).
81 See id. at 757–58 (“[W]e have declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits
traditionally recognized.”).
82 See id. at 760–62.
83 See id. at 759.
84 See id. at 758 & n.12.
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whether the nonresident corporation is domestic or foreign could sway an
“at home” analysis as to the parent.85 The arguments for establishing
vicarious, general jurisdiction after Bauman are analyzed below.
A. WHETHER THE SUBSIDIARY IS “PARADIGMATICALLY” AT HOME OR
“ESSENTIALLY” AT HOME BY VIRTUE OF CONTINUOUS AND SYSTEMATIC
BUSINESS OPERATIONS

Corporations are traditionally “at home” for purposes of general
jurisdiction in their state of incorporation and the state in which they
maintain a principal place of business, if the two are distinct.86 One
academic has termed these dual corporate homes the “paradigmatic
affiliations” with the forum that justify the exercise of general
jurisdiction.87 Paradigmatic affiliations are the strongest but not exclusive
affiliations that justify general jurisdiction. Goodyear confirmed that a
corporate defendant’s subjection to general jurisdiction is not necessarily
limited to those forums in which it is “incorporated or has its principal
place of business.”88 Rather, the “at home” inquiry retains an additional
strand under which a foreign corporation could have “the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts” to render it
“essentially” at home in the forum such that a court could adjudicate a suit
unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.89
If a corporate subsidiary is at home in one of the paradigmatic ways,
and its contacts are imputed to the parent, the Court may be more inclined
to find the parent at home in the forum under prong three of the Bauman
test. To the contrary, where the subsidiary is “essentially at home” in the
forum by virtue of its “continuous and systematic” business contacts, and
its contacts are imputed to the parent, the Court may be less likely to find

85

See id. at 762–63.
Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”).
87 Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 721,
728 (1988).
88 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849. Other scholars have suggested that the Court had
foreign corporations in mind when it left open “continuous business operations” as a means
for establishing general jurisdiction. By default, foreign corporations would have no state
of incorporation or principal place of business in the United States in which they could be
deemed “at home.” Thus the slightly open doors could be to leave open room to argue that
a foreign corporation should be subject to general jurisdiction in U.S. state in which most
of their business is transacted. See Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz:
Reconciling Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865, 889
(2013).
89 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
86
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the parent “at home” in the forum.90 Though the Court did not go so far
as to create such a per se rule, it provided strong direction.
In Bauman, the Court glossed over the first prong of its framework
and assumed “for purposes of [that] decision only” that MBUSA was “at
home” in California.91 Because the Court later acknowledged that
MBUSA is neither incorporated in California nor retains its principal place
of business there, it must be presumed that the Court assumed MBUSA to
be “essentially at home” by virtue of its continuous and systematic
business contacts.92 Indeed, MBUSA produced 2.4% of Daimler’s
worldwide sales, generating billions of dollars in sales revenue for
Daimler.93 Nevertheless, the Court held that MBUSA’s sales in the
forum—which were presumed sufficient to render MBUSA “essentially at
home” in California—were insufficient once attributed to Daimler to
render Daimler at home there.
Concluding that Daimler was not “at home” in the forum under prong
three of its analysis, the Court’s first observation was that “neither Daimler
nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its
principal place of business there.”94 The Court’s first matter of concern in
going about its prong-three “at home” analysis as to the parent was to
determine whether the subsidiary was paradigmatically at home in the
forum. After observing that MBUSA was not paradigmatically at home
but only—it must be presumed—”essentially at home,” the Court quickly
determined that imputation of the subsidiary’s contacts to the parent would
be insufficient to render the parent “at home” in the forum. Because the
Bauman test in no way limits its first prong to subsidiaries that are
paradigmatically at home, it confirms that both paradigmatic and
“essentially at home” affiliations remain open avenues for accomplishing
vicarious, general jurisdiction. The Court’s analysis indicates, however,
90 See Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (“[T]he inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a
foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense “continuous and
systematic,” it is whether that corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”). But see Barriere
v. Cap Juluca, 12-23510-CIV, 2014 WL 652831 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) (finding a
foreign parent corporation subject to general jurisdiction after imputing to it the contacts
of its “essentially at home” subsidiary).
91 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 758.
92 Accord Suzanna Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme Court
Should Duck the Issue in DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 111,
117 (2013) (“The best option would be to revisit the question of MBUSA’s contacts with
California, which DaimlerChrysler unwisely conceded were sufficient to satisfy the
‘continuous and systematic’ test for general jurisdiction. Under current doctrine, it is
highly questionable that a federal court in California has general personal jurisdiction over
MBUSA, and the Court could reverse the Ninth Circuit on that ground.”).
93 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 766–67.
94 Id. at 761.
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that paradigmatic affiliations will provide the weightiest imputable
contacts for vicarious jurisdiction and that the success of “essentially at
home” affiliations may be more limited by comparison.
Such a conclusion is consistent with the Court’s history of largely
restricting the exercise of general jurisdiction to a defendant’s principal
place of business or the state of incorporation—its paradigmatic
affiliations. In both Helicopteros and in Goodyear, the Court found the
defendant corporations’ business transactions in the forum were not
sufficiently continuous or systematic to render it “essentially at home” for
purposes of general jurisdiction.95 The only case in which the Court has
found that a foreign corporation’s business activities in the forum were
amply continuous and systematic to render it “at home” in the forum was
Perkins.96 Yet, whether Perkins is a case about a foreign corporation being
rendered “at home” by virtue of continuous and systematic business
transactions is questionable.
More likely, Perkins presents a case in which a foreign corporation
was subject to a court’s general jurisdiction in its principal place of
business—a true paradigmatic affiliation case.97 Rather than deciding
Perkins based on the corporation’s “continuous and systematic” business
activities within the State, the Court looked to those activities to determine
that Ohio had in fact become the company’s principal place of business
during wartime. Indeed, the Court reiterated this understanding of Perkins
in Bauman when it stated, “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if
temporary, place of business.”98
The notion that the Court in Perkins based its assertion of general
jurisdiction on the quantity of the defendant’s business transactions within
the forum is an unfortunate misnomer that may have given some plaintiffs
false hope of a broader doctrine of general jurisdiction. Accordingly, for
plaintiffs seeking to establish vicarious, general jurisdiction over a
nonresident corporation where the subsidiary is not paradigmatically “at
home” in the forum, such that the “continuous and systematic” standard is
the sole remaining avenue for finding that subsidiary “at home,” Perkins
may provide little hope of gain if in fact Perkins was decided on
paradigmatic affiliations with the forum.
Thus, where a subsidiary is deemed “essentially at home” rather than
paradigmatically at home in the forum, the Court may require something
more to substantiate the parent’s contacts with the forum. What, exactly,
95 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 418; Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2856–57.
96 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447.
97 See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
98 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 756; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779.
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that “something more” might be is uncertain, though three considerations
remain relevant: 1) whether imputation was accomplished by agency or
alter ego theories; 2) whether the subsidiary whose contacts the plaintiff
seeks to impute to the parent is joined as a defendant; and 3) whether
assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant corporation raises foreign
relations or foreign commerce concerns. These concerns will be discussed
in turn below.
B. WHETHER IMPUTATION IS ACCOMPLISHED BY AGENCY OR ALTER EGO
THEORIES

Agency theories of imputation are available where the parent
corporation does not have direct ownership of the subsidiary but maintains
some level of control over it such that attribution of contacts would be
appropriate.99 Alter-ego theories of imputation are available where the
relationship between the parent corporation and its subsidiary is such that
corporate separateness should be disregarded. Generally, alter-ego
theories are applied in one of two circumstances: 1) Where the subsidiary
acts on behalf of the parent—doing what the parent itself would do;100 or
2) Where the corporate structure of the parent and the subsidiary are so
intertwined that the corporations appear to operate as part of the same
entity, such as where the two entities have interlocking directorates,
personnel, or document exchange.101
Bauman indicates that both agency and alter-ego theories of
imputation are available to establish general jurisdiction over foreign
corporate parents, but that alter-ego theories may be more readily available
than agency theories, which will be subject to greater limitations in the
context of general jurisdiction.102 If an agency theory of imputation is
employed to pierce the jurisdictional veil as to a foreign corporate parent,
99 See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 48–49 (N.Y. 1967)
(finding that the localized, sister corporation performed services “on behalf of” the foreign
corporation such that the foreign corporation itself performed the services locally); Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 255 F.3d 88, 96–99 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding an investor
relations office in New York acted on behalf of foreign corporate parent such that foreign
parents subject to suit in New York based on business activities there); Cartwright v.
Fokker Aircraft U.S.A., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 389, 393 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that the
domestic subsidiary-distributor was an agent of the foreign corporate parent for purposes
of establishing jurisdiction over the foreign parent).
100 E.g., In re Telectronics Paper Sys., 953 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Ohio 1997), rev’d on
other grounds, 221 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000).
101 Compare Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packaging Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335 (1925),
with United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 816 (1948).
102 See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (“[W]e need not pass judgment on invocation of an
agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals court’s
analysis be sustained.”).
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a plaintiff could be limited by the subsidiary-agent’s relationship to the
litigation—whether the subsidiary-agent’s contacts with the forum relate
to the underlying claims—given traditional principles of agency theory in
general personal jurisdiction.103 On the other hand, where an alter ego or
merger theory of imputation is used, a plaintiff will not be hindered by the
subsidiary’s relationship with the litigation, but rather by the subsidiary’s
relationship with the parent corporation. If the subsidiary’s relationship
with the parent is too attenuated to satisfy an alter-ego theory, plaintiffs
seeking to attribute contacts will be relegated to arguing agency theories
of imputation.
Before the Court in Bauman was an attempt to employ an agency
theory of imputation to render the foreign parent corporation liable in
California for the activities of a direct subsidiary in Argentina, based on
the imputed contacts of an indirect subsidiary in California.104 Said
another way, the plaintiffs in Bauman wanted to assert vicarious
jurisdiction over the parent corporation by imputing to it the contacts of a
California subsidiary-“agent” whose contacts with the forum were
unrelated to the underlying, Argentina-based claim. Given MBUSA’s
relationship with the litigation and the forum, it could only be subject to
general jurisdiction, and not specific personal jurisdiction, in California
because the underlying action did not arise from MBUSA’s contact in
California.105 Traditionally, a court could exercise jurisdiction on a
foreign corporation if process was served on its appointed in-state agent.106
Yet, service of process on the corporate agent would only subject the
foreign corporation to the court’s jurisdiction for claims related to the
business it transacted in the state—its specific jurisdiction.107 In Bauman,
the Court recalled this limiting principle when it speculated that using
agency theories of imputation to exercise general jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant for claims unrelated to the subsidiary’s activities in the
forum may be inappropriate in the first instance: “A subsidiary . . . might
be its parent’s agent for claims arising in the place where the subsidiary
operates, yet not its agent regarding claims arising elsewhere.”108 The
Court made no further announcement as to the propriety of agency theories
of imputation where the imputable contacts of the “agent” are unrelated to
the underlying claims. The Court likewise made no announcement as to
103

See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
See generally Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 750–51, 758–60.
105 Id. at 750–51.
106 See discussion, supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
107 Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22 (1907) (“[S]uch assent
cannot properly be implied where it affirmatively appears, as it does here, that the business
was not transacted in [the forum].”).
108 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759.
104
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the propriety of using an agency theory to impute the contacts of an
indirect subsidiary to gain vicarious jurisdiction.109 Instead, the Court
simply held that under no circumstance could the Ninth Circuit’s agency
theory be upheld.110
With this landscape in mind, where an agency theory is used to
impute a subsidiary’s contacts to a foreign corporation, the due process
analysis of whether the parent corporation is “at home” in the forum after
imputation may be severely weakened if the imputed contacts of the
“agent” are unrelated to the claims. In traditional terms, the agent whose
contacts are being imputed will be sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over the parent only when the claims relate to that agent’s
activities in the forum.111 In other words, an agency theory of imputation
will likely only be successful if invoked where the subsidiary, if named as
a defendant, would be subject to the court’s specific jurisdiction. Thus, if
an agency theory of imputation is used, and the “at home” subsidiary’s
contacts with the forum are unrelated to the underlying claims, the Court
will likely find that the subsidiary’s contacts will not render the foreign
parent “at home” in the forum for the purpose of general jurisdiction
because the subsidiary would not be the parent’s agent for those unrelated
109 By way of comparison, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunizes
from suit any “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign sovereign. 28 U.S.C. § 1603. Under
the statute, “agency or instrumentality” includes corporate entities that are wholly or
majority owned by the sovereign at the time of filing. Id. § 1603(b); see also Dole Foods
Co. v Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003). The Court has further determined that an entity
that is merely indirectly owned by the sovereign is not an “agency or instrumentality” for
purposes of the statute. Dole Foods Co., 538 U.S. at 474. While MBUSA was an indirectly
owned subsidiary of Daimler during the pendency of the litigation, it was wholly owned
by Daimler “at times relevant to [the] suit” but not at the time of filing. Bauman, 134 S. Ct.
at 753 n.3. Whether the FSIA’s approach or the Dole Foods rule are applicable in the
context of non-sovereign, private corporate activity is to be determined. Litigations should
keep Dole Foods at hand, however, when attempting to use agency theories of imputation
to establish general jurisdiction over a foreign parent based on the contacts of an indirect
subsidiary. It could be that the Court would find agency theory unavailable in such a
context. Likely, the rule of thumb to take away is that a federal statute governing the cause
of action may affect whether and to what extent an agency theory may be used under the
circumstances. See also United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51, 70–71 (1998) (holding
that a participation-and-control test looking to the parent corporation’s supervision over
subsidiary cannot be used to identify operation of a facility resulting in direct parental
liability under CERCLA).
110 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60 (citations omitted) (“The Ninth Circuit’s agency
theory thus appears to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they
have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the
‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear.”).
111 Accord Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at 17,
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2013) (No. 11-965) (“[N]one of this Court’s cases
have used ‘agency’ to impose general jurisdiction under circumstances remotely
approaching this case’s.”).

22

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1

claims.
Any other holding would be an expansion of general
jurisdiction—a doctrine that the Court continues to restrict—as well as
agency law.
Further, the subsidiary at issue in Bauman—MBUSA—was an
indirect subsidiary of Daimler.112 That is, it was neither wholly nor
majority owned by the parent. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could hardly
hope to use an alter ego or merger theory to impute MBUSA’s contacts to
Daimler because such theories are based on the notion of “like-identity.”113
Without interlocking corporate structures between the two entities, the
plaintiffs would have faced high hurdles to satisfy a merger theory, and
with an agency theory available to them of so low a caliber that it would
practically always be satisfied, the plaintiffs in Bauman took the path of
least resistance and neglected to allege that MBUSA was an alter-ego of
Daimler.114
Because the plaintiffs in Bauman did not allege an “alter ego” theory
to impute MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler, the Court made no comment on
the propriety or strength of invoking alter ego theories in the context of
general jurisdiction.115 Presumably, however, imputation by theories of
merger or alter ego could supply imputed contacts weighty enough to tilt
the scales to a finding that the parent corporation is at home in the forum,
irrespective of whether the “at home” subsidiary’s contacts are related to
the litigation.116 Merger and alter ego theories of imputation, unlike
agency theories, would not be limited to instances in which the
subsidiary’s forum contacts are related to the claim because no such
traditional principles apply to limit the boundaries of the relationship.
Instead, such theories meet resistance based on the strength of the
subsidiary’s relationship to the parent. Often, whether the subsidiary is
wholly or majority owned by the parent is dispositive of whether the
112

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 752.
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
114 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758.
115 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (“This Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign
corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its
in-state subsidiary. Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a
subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so
dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego.”).
116 Accord Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at 9,
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2013) (No. 11-965) (“Absent a specificjurisdiction basis, . . . nothing short of the “merger” or “alter ego” standard can satisfy the
Due Process Clause’s requirement that jurisdiction over each defendant be shown
individually.”); Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive
Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1986)
(“If merger is shown, however, all of the activities of the subsidiary are by definition
activities of the parent. Merger requires a greater showing of interconnectedness than
attribution, but once shown, its scope is broader.”).
113

2015]

Vicarious Juridiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman

23

entities are sufficiently intertwined to justify ignoring corporate
separateness and applying an alter-ego theory to impute contacts and hold
the parent responsible for the subsidiary’s behavior.117 Accordingly,
where the subsidiary is a true alter ego of the parent, a court may be less
hesitant to find the parent “at home” based on the subsidiary’s imputed
contacts because the relationship between the two entities is by definition
more robust. Holding a parent responsible for acts of a subsidiary with
which its relationship is so intertwined that corporate separateness may be
appropriately disregarded is a justifiable basis for exercising general
jurisdiction based on imputation because it would be akin to holding the
parent corporation responsible for its own acts.
Thus, courts performing the third prong of the analysis may be more
likely to find that imputed contacts render the foreign defendant “at home”
where an alter ego theory of imputation is invoked. The Court leaves the
door open for both theories to successfully invoke general jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant, but in either circumstance, it is unclear from Bauman
what sort of standard would supply a satisfactory test for imputation.118
C. WHETHER THE SUBSIDIARY IS JOINED AS A DEFENDANT

If the subsidiary whose contacts are to be imputed is joined as a
defendant in the action, courts may find that the jurisdictional contacts
imputed to the parent are weightier when conducting the final “at home”
analysis as to the parent. As observed by a Florida District Court, where
a plaintiff has joined the subsidiary as a co-defendant, and the subsidiary
has not objected to jurisdiction, the Court necessarily has power over the
subsidiary, and extending its jurisdiction to the parent—assuming a theory
of imputation has been met—would be most proper.119 First, this approach
best observes due process limits because courts would not proceed to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign parent based on the contacts of a
subsidiary as to whom no jurisdictional basis has been shown as a matter
of law. Second, this approach best honors corporate separateness by better
ensuring that parent corporations are held vicariously liable for a
117

See supra note 109.
See supra note 10.
119 See Barriere v. Cap Juluca, No.12-23510-CIV, 2014 WL 652831, slip op. at *9 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) (“Additionally, in Daimler, the foreign Plaintiffs attempted to gain
jurisdiction over the foreign defendant by piggybacking on the defendant’s subsidiary’s
contacts and imputing them back to the defendant. The U.S.-based subsidiary, however,
was not a defendant in that action. In the case at bar, the Plaintiff has alleged agency
relationships among [the subsidiaries] and [the foreign parent]. Unlike in Daimler, the
alleged agent is a co-defendant in the case, and it has not objected to jurisdiction. Thus,
Defendant Cap Juluca is asking this Court to dismiss it even where the Court already
properly exercises jurisdiction over the co-defendants. This, the court will not do.”).
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subsidiary’s actions only where both the parent and the subsidiary may
have collaborated in the wrongful conduct.
A court has power to adjudicate claims against defendants over
whom it has personal jurisdiction.120 Where a subsidiary is joined as a
defendant in an action, a court can actually exercise personal jurisdiction
over the subsidiary, and such jurisdiction is established as a matter of law.
On the other hand, where the subsidiary is not joined, a court cannot
actually exercise jurisdiction over the subsidiary even if jurisdiction would
be proper, and jurisdiction over the non-joined subsidiary is merely
theoretical. A court may be hesitant to use the subsidiary’s contacts with
the forum to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident parent when it is
unclear or otherwise unestablished that the court would have power to
adjudicate the same claims against the subsidiary in the first instance.
In Bauman, the plaintiffs did not join MBUSA in the action, and the
Court accordingly did not have power over it; instead, the Court
“assumed” that MBUSA was at home in the forum for purposes of
exercising general jurisdiction over Daimler.121 The Court acknowledged
that MBUSA held no “paradigmatic” affiliations with the forum and that
whether it would be subject to general jurisdiction in California under
Goodyear was uncertain.122 As in Bauman, if the non-joined subsidiary
has no paradigmatic affiliations with the forum and could be subject to
general jurisdiction only by virtue of Goodyear’s “essentially at home”
standard, a plaintiff could decline joining the subsidiary in the action, go
after only the parent, and face less resistance establishing general
jurisdiction over the parent because the subsidiary would be unable to
contest jurisdiction as to itself.123 A court exercising its jurisdictional
power over the parent based on the jurisdiction it “could have” over the
subsidiary creates a more attenuated link between the parent and the forum
that does not justify the exercise of general jurisdiction. On the other hand,
if the non-joined subsidiary is paradigmatically at home in the forum, the
impropriety of using its jurisdictional contacts to sue the foreign parent is
significantly less. In that case, whether the subsidiary is at home in the
forum, though not litigated, is virtually assured such that the court would
be able to litigate claims against that subsidiary.
Regardless of whether the non-joined subsidiary is paradigmatically
at home, the basic theory of vicarious jurisdiction presupposes that the
120

See discussion supra Part I.A.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 (2014).
122 Id. at 752.
123 E.g., Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (noting that Daimler failed to object to plaintiff’s
assertion that MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction in California because MBUSA
was not a co-defendant).
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foreign parent is responsible alongside the subsidiary for the wrongful
conduct,124 and where a plaintiff does not join the subsidiary as a codefendant, suspicion should be raised that imputation is improper in the
first instance. If the plaintiff’s argument is that the parent corporation
should be held vicariously liable—that is, liable as a joint actor—for the
wrongful conduct, then the subsidiary should be joined as a reflection and
confirmation of the subsidiary and parent’s dual participation in the
conduct. Where a plaintiff neglects to join the subsidiary, but goes after
the parent, the concern is that the subsidiary may be the truly wrongful
actor, but the parent has the deeper pockets. Disregard for corporate
separateness where the parent did not collaborate with the subsidiary in
wrongful conduct would fun afoul of the basic concept justifying the
responsibility-shifting function of vicarious jurisdiction.125
Accordingly, imputation theories to establish vicarious jurisdiction
are best invoked where the subsidiary is named as a co-defendant. First,
this approach ensures that the court predicates its power to adjudicate
claims against the parent on an affirmation of its power to adjudicate
claims against the subsidiary in the first place. Second, this approach
reflects the joint responsibility concept implicit in the doctrine of vicarious
jurisdiction. Any other rule would encourage foul play in litigation.
D. HAS THE COURT ADDED A “TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT” INQUIRY TO
THE PARENT’S “AT HOME” DETERMINATION?

After applying its three-part test to the facts in Bauman, the Court
turned to an examination of the transaction’s international context and
determined that the Ninth Circuit’s sweeping rule of vicarious, general
jurisdiction would greatly burden U.S. relations with other sovereigns.126
The progression of the Court’s analysis indicates that whether the parent
is a foreign corporation or a nonresident, a domestic corporation could tilt
the scales for or against a finding of general jurisdiction.
The readiness of U.S. courts to hold foreign corporations liable for
the conduct of their U.S. subsidiaries is often met with frustration by other
countries that embrace a less expansive approach to general jurisdiction.127
As a result, the United State’s liberal exercise of general jurisdiction has

124 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 116, at 12 (recognizing that imputation
theories disregard the separateness of corporate entities and shift responsibility from the
subsidiary to the parent).
125 See discussion supra Part II.B.
126 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762–63.
127 Id. at 763. European countries, as an example, embrace a much narrower application
of general jurisdiction, permitting suit against corporations for unrelated claims only in the
country of their domicile. Id.
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hampered negotiations of international treaties due to objections of foreign
governments to the expansive exercise of general jurisdiction in U.S.
district courts.128 Unlike foreign corporations, subjecting domestic
corporations to a court’s general jurisdiction will almost never offend or
intrude into the sovereignty of another country because the domestic
corporation is, by definition, formed pursuant to the laws of a U.S. State.
Recognizing that subjecting Daimler to suit could inflame foreign
frustration with U.S. jurisprudence regarding foreign entities, the Court
concluded that the transaction’s international context weighed heavily
against exercising jurisdiction over Daimler.129
In addition to creating tense relations with foreign sovereigns, broad
and unpredictable applications of general jurisdiction could dissuade
foreign entities from investing in business ventures within the United
States.130 State substantive laws that supply the theories of imputation
vary from state to state.131 Inconsistent state imputation laws present
foreign corporations with great uncertainty and diminished predictability,
making it difficult for foreign corporations “to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit.”132 Unpredictability and uncertainty as
to where a foreign corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction
creates an operational nightmare for foreign corporations whose conduct
may satisfy the laws of one state yet violate the laws of another.
Accordingly, foreign corporations may be deterred from business within
the United States for fear of increased exposure to liability where general
jurisdiction is so expansive as to reach a foreign corporation for claims
unrelated to the business it transacts within a given forum.
Nonresident domestic corporations are not similarly burdened by
unpredictability and uncertainty as to where they might be hailed into court
to defend themselves. Large domestic corporations that do business
nationally are subject to specific jurisdiction in all state forums under the
minimum contacts test of Int’l Shoe.133 In the context of general
jurisdiction, at least one U.S. court can exercise jurisdiction over a
domestic corporation based on its paradigmatic affiliations.134 To the
contrary, foreign corporations have no such paradigmatic affiliations, and
no U.S. court may exercise general jurisdiction absent a showing that the
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E.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854.
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foreign corporation is “essentially at home” in that forum. Appropriately,
the Court in Bauman foreclosed general, vicarious jurisdiction over
Daimler and steered its jurisprudence toward a rule of greater
predictability for corporations in order to encourage foreign business in
the United States.
By limiting the extent to which a foreign corporation is subjected to
a court’s general jurisdiction, the Court accounted for the federal interests
in the “[g]overnment’s foreign relations policies”135 as well as the
potentially negative impact on foreign business investment. After
Bauman, a court may be more likely to exercise general jurisdiction over
a nonresident, domestic, as opposed to foreign, corporation that has been
deemed “at home” under prong three of the Bauman analysis because the
foreign comity inquiry will almost always be settled against a domestic
corporation but in favor of a foreign corporation. Accordingly, whether a
plaintiff can successfully use vicarious jurisdiction arguments to exercise
general jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant may depend
upon whether the corporation is a domestic nonresident or a truly foreign
corporation.
CONCLUSION
At times, a corporation may be held responsible for the wrongful
conduct of a separate corporate entity with which it has some significant
relationship. In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court addressed the
boundaries of this sort of corporate, jurisdictional blame-shifting in the
context general jurisdiction. The Court held that in limited circumstances,
the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of general jurisdiction over a
parent corporation based on its subsidiary’s relationship with the forum.
While lower courts routinely exercised jurisdiction over foreign parents
after a simple finding that an “at home” subsidiary’s contacts with the
forum could be imputed to the parent, the Court in Bauman rejected that
approach and announced a new test that requires a jurisdictional inquiry
be independently conducted as to the parent after the subsidiary’s contacts
have been imputed to it.
After Bauman, the question arises: Under what circumstances would
a foreign corporation, imputed with its subsidiary’s contacts, be deemed
“at home” in a forum wherein its own contacts with the forum were
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction in the first instance? A close
examination of the Court’s analysis in Bauman offers several insights into
135 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987). It
likewise cures any separation of powers concerns, reducing the risk that the judicial branch
would, by its rulings, create tension between the United States and other sovereigns.
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remaining avenues for using vicarious jurisdiction arguments to establish
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
First, a subsidiary that is paradigmatically at home in the forum,
rather than “essentially at home” there, will have weightier jurisdictional
contacts for imputation such that the “at home” inquiry as to the parent
will be settled against the corporation. Second, if the imputation theory
used to attribute contacts is an alter ego or merger theory, the jurisdictional
contacts will be weightier and subject to fewer traditional limitations than
an agency theory of imputation. Third, if the subsidiary is joined as a
defendant in the matter, then its imputed contacts are more likely to weigh
in favor of jurisdiction because the basic concept of vicarious jurisdiction
is that two entities acted together or as one entity in some wrongful
conduct. Failure to join the subsidiary also forces the court to make a
jurisdictional finding as to the parent based on the presumed, but not
established, jurisdiction it might have over the subsidiary. Without legal
certainty that the court has power to adjudicate claims over the subsidiary
in the first place, the jurisdictional contacts of the subsidiary are weaker
when imputed to the parent. Fourth, suits against foreign corporations,
unlike nonresident domestic corporations, burden U.S. foreign relations
with other nations. Accordingly, a comity analysis will likely be settled
against the exercise of general jurisdiction over the foreign corporations.
After Bauman, the availability of vicarious, general jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation is limited to those places wherein it—and not simply
its subsidiary—is deemed “at home.” When conducting an at home
analysis as to the parent, each of the considerations identified above will
be examined and weighed on a case-by-case basis. Whether any one factor
is dispositive is uncertain. The Court set a high bar in Bauman,
intentionally limiting the sweep of general, vicarious jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the Court did not foreclose its availability entirely, leaving
a window of hope for plaintiffs and a shield of protection for foreign
corporations.

